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It is relatively easy for a sentimentalist to make the case that someone is, say, admirable or 
enviable if and only if it is fitting to admire or envy her. And it’s plausible that whether such 
attitudes are fitting depends on something about those attitudes themselves, or even facts 
about human tendencies to respond to certain things in certain ways, as sentimentalists say, 
although this is much more controversial. But for sentimentalism to be a serious rival to 
competing theories in metaethics, it must also account for central moral properties such as 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of agents and rightness and wrongness of actions in 
terms of some kind of emotional response. In this paper, I will focus on two tough questions 
for such ambitious neo-sentimentalism. The first concerns the basis on which blaming 
attitudes are fitting. There’s broad agreement that (reactive) blame is merited on the basis of 
the quality of the agent’s will, but it’s not trivial to delineate genuinely sentimentalist criteria 
for a blameworthy quality of will. The second issue concerns the relationship between blame 
and wrongdoing. While it is agents who are to blame, it is actions that are right or wrong. 
The question, then, is how fitting attitudes towards agents can ground the moral status of 
actions as obligatory, permissible, or impermissible.  
 On the issue of fitting blame, I begin by sketching a general sentimentalist picture of 
what makes any attitude fitting. Roughly, on my ideal subjectivist view, fittingness of an 
attitude is determined by the nature of the attitude together with the related desires of a 
suitably idealized subject. Blame, I claim, consists of negative reactive attitudes that target 
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an undesirable quality of the will of the agent. I argue that the best motivated 
characterization of a morally authoritative subject is of a well-informed and self-respecting 
rational agent who serially occupies the position of each affected party in imagination and 
gives equal weight to the strength of emotional responses in everyone’s shoes without 
aggregating the numbers – for short, a Nagelian Imp. The consequence of these views for the 
question of fitting blame is that someone is blameworthy when and because she has a quality 
of will that a Nagelian Imp wouldn’t want her to have – roughly speaking, when she fails to 
sufficiently constrain or shape her planning by the will of others. 
 Second, I address a key challenge to ambitious sentimentalism. When it comes to 
rightness and wrongness, it is fairly clear that an action can be wrong or impermissible even 
if the agent is not blameworthy. It is, after all, possible for a person to have an excuse or be 
exempt from blame, even if what they do is wrong. But it is tempting to think, as Allan 
Gibbard (1990) and Stephen Darwall (2006) do, that if someone either is blameworthy or 
would be blameworthy as a result of an action if they lacked an excuse or exemption, then 
the action is wrong. Call this the Blame-Wrongness Link. Many philosophers have recently 
challenged it. In particular, they have argued that people can be blameworthy for permissible 
actions. If so, it seems the link between assessing an agent’s quality of the will and the 
permissibility of her action is decisively broken. How, then, could sentimentalists hope to 
ground the moral status of actions on attitudes towards agents?  
 In response to this challenge, I grant that there are cases of blameworthiness without 
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, I maintain that even in these cases, the permissibility or 
impermissibility of actions indirectly hangs on fitting attitudes based on a possible quality of 
will of the agent. Roughly, when it is possible to perform an action while meeting all the 
conditions of accountability without meriting blame, it is permissible. When it is not 
possible to perform an action without meriting blame, unless one has an excuse, it is 
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impermissible. In such cases, there is what I call an external support for blame.1 If this move, 
call it the Indirect Blame-Wrongness Link, is successful, questions about the agent’s 
possible quality of will (and external support for blame) turn out to be central to normative 
inquiry.  
The Indirect Blame-Wrongness Link has interesting normative consequences. In 
particular, since one’s quality of will is centrally a matter of the kind of plans one acts on in 
the circumstances, and there are often several possible plans for bringing about the same 
outcome, blameworthiness turns out to depend not only on what one intends to bring about, 
but also on how one intends to bring it about. Since permissibility or impermissibility, in 
turn, is determined by possible quality of will, it will depend on how it is possible to bring 
about an outcome; that is, on the causal paths available to the agent and how other agents are 
involved in the causal paths, not just on the impersonal desirability of the possible outcomes. 
For example, if the only way to bring about an impersonally desirable outcome requires 
subordinating the good of one to the good of many, as in the Footbridge trolley case 
(pushing a heavy person on the tracks to save five others), a Nagelian Imp will predictably 
resent the agent who chooses the option (insofar as she is accountable), and the act will be 
impermissible. Roughly, this is because a Nagelian Imp’s attitude depends on the strength of 
emotional response in each affected person’s shoes, not on the number of people who have 
the response, and that the resentment caused by imagining being used as a means to advance 
another’s good at the expense of a like good of one’s own is stronger than the resentment 
caused by failure to be saved. In short, an independently motivated sentimentalist account of 
moral metaphysics turns out to provide indirect support for nonconsequentialist normative 
                                                
1 This proposal builds on the work of Frances Kamm and others. 
2 In tribute to R.M. Hare, who laid out this kind of approach very clearly (Hare 1981). 
3 The notion of self-respect I’m using here isn’t meant to be heavily theoretically loaded – just the ordinary sort 
of opposite of self-abasement. 
4 This view of blame is defended, among others, by Strawson (1963) and Wallace (1996). It is challenged by 
Scanlon (2008). I have argued that there’s good reason to think that blame comes in both varieties, since 
forgiveness does, too (Kauppinen forthcoming). 
5 The echoes of Kant’s Formula of Humanity are obviously not a coincidence. 
6 For discussion of such cases, see Capes 2012. 
7 As Remy Debes pointed out, sometimes following rules itself displays my attitudes towards other people. 
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theory – although some might reasonably argue that this shows only that metaethical and 
normative projects must be pursued hand in hand. 
 
1. Fitting Attitudes and Actual Sentiments 
While one can be a sentimentalist about moral judgment or epistemology, in this paper I 
focus on metaphysical sentimentalism. Metaphysical sentimentalists hold that moral 
properties are grounded in a subject’s sentimental response. As Hume puts it in summarizing 
his view, 
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined 
by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a 
spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. (Hume 
1777/2006, 270) 
 
When Hume talks about a spectator, he doesn’t mean just anyone. As other passages make 
clear, he’s thinking of someone who adopts a common or general point of view when 
considering the consequences the agent’s motives or traits tend to produce. It is the 
approbation of such subjects that determines what is a virtue. 
 While Hume is happy to talk about the relationship between sentimental responses 
and the properties that give rise to them in causal terms, such reductive approaches are 
rejected by most contemporary sentimentalists. According to the neo-sentimentalist view, 
insofar as moral properties are determined by our attitudes, it is fitting attitudes that count. 
We can’t simply observe what causes approbation to discover what is right or good, but 
must reflect on what merits it. The fact that we’re disposed to approve of something doesn’t 
mean it’s good or right, since it is always an open question (as Moore said) whether 
something we’re disposed to approve of is good. This is at least in part because moral 
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properties are normative for us in a way that powers to cause responses in some subjects are 
not.  
There is a lot to be said for this new orthodoxy. Nevertheless, I want to push back a 
little bit. There is nothing sentimentalist about Fitting Attitude (FA) accounts as such. After 
all, non-naturalist intuitionists such as A.C. Ewing (1947) have endorsed FA analyses. For 
all that FA says, the fact that resentment, say, is fitting towards an agent might be a primitive 
mind-independent fact that obtains regardless of what sentimental responses people have or 
could have. The distinction between a generic FA analysis and a neo-sentimentalist FA 
analysis must lie in there being some significant role for sentimental responses or 
dispositions in making a response fitting. When we ask whether a joke merits amusement, 
for example, the correct answer will have something to do with what actually amuses people. 
At the extreme, it makes no sense to say that something merits amusement if you can’t get 
anyone to laugh at it.  
What, then, makes an attitude fitting for a sentimentalist? I’ll set aside nominally 
sentimentalist views that appeal to the correctness or accuracy of a belief or presentation 
contained in an emotional response (e.g. Tappolet 2011). Such accounts presuppose that 
there are attitude-independent facts that make the belief or presentation correct. How, then, 
should sentimentalists understand fittingness? My own hypothesis, which I can only sketch 
here, is that evaluative attitudes have both descriptive content and normative content suitably 
related to the descriptive content. The descriptive content presents things as being in a 
certain non-normative way, and the normative content refers to the related desires of a 
subject who is authoritative in one way or another. For example, the content of admiration is 
something along the lines that the target has done something challenging that is of great 
worth. It is an ordinary empirical question whether the agent has done something 
challenging for her, but whether it is of great worth is a different matter. My suggestion is 
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that here we need to turn to the desires of, say, an aesthetically or morally authoritative 
subject, and ask, roughly, whether such a subject would desire that the target make the 
challenging effort and desire that others emulate the target. So whether it is morally fitting to 
admire Mahatma Gandhi (or more specifically his non-violent campaign for independence) 
depends both on whether what he did was difficult and whether any morally authoritative 
subject would want him to have done so and want others to do likewise (mutatis mutandis, 
of course). On this picture, whether the attitude is fitting is jointly determined by non-
normative facts and the relevant reactions of one or another kind of authoritative subject. In 
virtue of the latter feature, evaluative or normative properties are ontologically subjective or 
attitude-dependent: attitudes come first in the order of explanation.  
 The strategy of approaching normative issues in terms of the reactions of an idealized 
subject, or of our responses when we’re at our relevant best, was characteristic of traditional 
sentimentalism of Hume and Smith. Such approaches have not been popular recently. In 
particular, non-trivial, non-morally specified impartial spectator or ideal observer views in 
ethics face many serious objections. Even if we leave aside general objections to naturalistic 
views in metaethics, as I will do here, there are specific challenges that Rawls (1971), for 
example, nicely pointed out. His objection to impartial spectator accounts can be formulated 
as a kind of dilemma: Either the impartial spectator is underspecified, so that no normative 
conclusions follow from the metaethical account, or the account conflates impartiality with 
impersonality.  
Here it is crucial that there are many alternative and competing ways of specifying a 
morally authoritative subject. What Rawls had in mind was a specification of the impartial 
spectator that I’ll call the Utility Hare.2 The Utility Hare takes on the preferences of 
everyone as his own and desires the action or adoption of the rule that maximizes his 
                                                
2 In tribute to R.M. Hare, who laid out this kind of approach very clearly (Hare 1981). 
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expected utility. On such views, famously, the distinction between persons disappears, as it 
is just the satisfaction of preferences that matters, regardless of who gets the benefit and who 
pays the cost.  
One might reject such an account on the basis of its normative consequences, as 
Rawls does. But I think the Utility Hare is independently implausible as a specification of a 
morally authoritative advisor. The point of idealizing, as classical sentimentalists saw it, is to 
guide our non-ideal sentimental responses so that we can robustly get along without 
continual strife, on terms that everyone can live with (see Kauppinen 2014). For such 
guidance, we need to look to or become someone who lacks the features that predictably 
cause the problems and has features that predictably help human beings avoid them. The fact 
that we actually defer to or aspire to become certain kinds of agents when making moral 
judgments reveals that we regard certain perspectives as authoritative. On this view, then, 
the idealizations involved in an authoritative moral perspective are importantly continuous 
with our practice. The problem with the Utility Hare is that it isn’t a solution to any problem 
of ours – treating people as distinct individuals whose boundaries matter isn’t what gets us 
into trouble, and aspiring or deferring to a humanly unattainable perspective won’t get us out 
of it. Consequently, it is hard to make the case that we somehow tacitly refer to the Hare’s 
responses when we issue moral verdicts, or that we should accord authority to them while 
moralizing. 
 What should we expect a morally authoritative subject to look like, then? Here’s 
what I think is a pretty good model, an impartial spectator I’ll call the Nagelian Imp. The 
Nagelian Imp is an average ordinary everyday self-respecting rational Joe (or Jenny) with 
some special abilities.3 He is well-informed and capable of imaginatively occupying the 
perspectives of each involved in an action and its salient alternatives, and keeping track of 
                                                
3 The notion of self-respect I’m using here isn’t meant to be heavily theoretically loaded – just the ordinary sort 
of opposite of self-abasement. 
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the responses he would have in each position. Those responses depend on two kinds of 
desire. As a rational and self-respecting agent, the Imp has the kind of basic desires we all do 
as such. He wants to be able to make up his own mind, and to ensure that, he wants there to 
be checks and balances against others bypassing or manipulating or incapacitating his 
decision-making. In short, he cares about his status or standing relative to others, as humans 
generally do. Otherwise, the Imp is chameleon-like, and to some extent takes on the 
contingent desires of the people whose position he occupies, but they take a backseat to his 
own desires.  
As impartial, the Imp doesn’t give any more or less weight to responses from any 
position. But he doesn’t aggregate the positive and negative responses into a big bundle. 
Rather, he prefers the action (or attitude) that is least unacceptable to the person for whom it 
is most unacceptable, to use Nagel’s (1979) famous phrase. That is, if there are possible 
actions, x and y, that bear on what the Imp wants in the shoes of A, B, and C, he’ll compare 
the strength of the strongest preference against x to the strength of the strongest preference 
against y. If, say, he disprefers x in A’s position more than y in either B or C’s position, he’ll 
prefer y to x. Consequently, if the Imp wouldn’t want you to do something, it’ll be 
something you wouldn’t want done to yourself in somebody else’s position, insofar as you 
are a rational and self-respecting agent with the desires that come with those features. If you 
did it, someone else would be worse off than you will be if you don’t. So the Imp’s 
responses will be authoritative at least to those who care about living with others on terms 
that can be expected to have sway with them without external sanctions, as long as they, too, 
are willing to moderate their demands. 
 I’ve argued elsewhere (Kauppinen 2014) that the Imp’s responses and fittingness of 
attitudes are connected as follows: an attitude is morally fitting if and only if any morally 
authoritative subject would endorse it. By endorsing an attitude I mean roughly wanting the 
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subject to manifest it. The underlying assumption is that part of what makes an attitude what 
it is can be found in what it motivates or disposes us to do or feel – for example, fear 
essentially motivates us to flee, admiration to emulate, and intention to act. So, for example, 
admiration is morally fitting in part if and only if and because the Imp would endorse 
emulating the target. 
 
2. Blameworthiness and Reactive Attitudes 
The reason why being right or wrong is a hard case for a sentimentalist is that such deontic 
properties are not obviously related to our sentiments, and it is particularly tempting to think 
they are independent of our attitudes altogether. It makes more sense to think we’ll never 
realize that something is wrong than to think we’ll never realize something is disgusting, 
even if we’re acquainted with it. But sentimentalists have attempted to make the connection. 
For example, Allan Gibbard argues that wrongness can be understood in terms of 
blameworthiness, and other properties in terms of wrongness. Here is how he links blame, 
blameworthiness, and wrongness: 
A person is to blame for an act if it makes sense for others to be angry at him – from 
a standpoint of full, impartial engagement […] – and if it makes sense for the person 
himself to feel guilt for what he has done. Morally wrong act are not always acts a 
person is to blame for; there are excuses. […] Wrong acts, roughly, are acts a person 
would be to blame for if he chose them in a normal state of mind. (1990, 223) 
 
There are two steps here: first blameworthiness is determined by fittingness of blame, and 
then wrongness in terms of possibly counterfactual blameworthiness. The second step is 
what I’ve called the Blame-Wrongness Link. I’ll get to challenges to it in the next section, 
but first, let’s focus on fitting blame. 
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Let us assume that at least the relevant kind of blame consists of reactive attitudes, 
most centrally guilt and the form of anger that we call resentment.4 On the neo-sentimentalist 
picture I sketched, the fittingness of these sentiments depends on their descriptive content 
and the related desires of suitable subjects. So let’s start with descriptive content. First, I 
want to reject what seems to me to be a deeply problematic orthodoxy, represented by Jay 
Wallace’s influential account. He maintains that “To be in a state of reactive emotion, one 
must believe that a person has violated some expectation that one holds the person to” (1996, 
19). At the same time, he says that “To hold someone to an expectation, I maintain, is to be 
susceptible to the reactive attitudes in one's relations with the person” (1996, 18). So reactive 
attitudes are defined in terms of beliefs about normative expectations, and normative 
expectations in terms of dispositions to reactive attitudes. This “mutual dependence” of 
attitudes and expectations may not be strictly circular, but it is at least uninformative and 
confusing. I believe the way out of this problem is to reject the first claim, and hold on to the 
plausible thesis that to have a normative expectation of someone is to be disposed to 
negative reactive attitudes when they fail to perform as desired. Thus, the test for whether I 
normatively expect you to open the door for me when my hands are full of heavy stuff is 
whether I’m disposed to blame you if you don’t open it. 
What, then, is the distinctive descriptive content of reactive attitudes? Strawson 
(1963/2003, 83) was no doubt right in saying that they are responses to the “quality of the 
will” of their target. My claim is that they present their target as having either a desirable or 
undesirable quality of the will. I’m using the term “will” fairly broadly, to cover both the 
thought process that led the target to their plans or intentions, and the plans and intentions 
themselves. Two agents who take the same means to the same end (and thus have the same 
                                                
4 This view of blame is defended, among others, by Strawson (1963) and Wallace (1996). It is challenged by 
Scanlon (2008). I have argued that there’s good reason to think that blame comes in both varieties, since 
forgiveness does, too (Kauppinen forthcoming). 
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maxim in the Kantian sense) may display a different quality of the will, if they’ve arrived at 
the intention by way of different practical reasoning. Your reactive attitudes towards me 
target the way my reasoning and plans take the your own will – your own plans and reasons 
– into account. In that sense, they are essentially intersubjective, and will not be fitting 
towards beings who lack a capacity to take another’s will into account in their planning. 
Consider resentment. Let me borrow D’Arms and Jacobson’s (forthcoming) method and try 
to interpret resentment in terms of its typical elicitors, motivational tendencies, and 
attenuators. Among other things, we resent being betrayed or misled, being taken advantage 
of, and failures to reciprocate. Such actions motivate us to take steps that force the target to 
acknowledge that we matter more than their behavior suggests. As Adam Smith says,  
The object … which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our 
enemy feel pain in his turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account of 
his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and to make him sensible, that 
the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner. (Smith 
1759–1790/2002, 112) 
 
I think that the best take on this phenomenon is that resentment presents its target A as 
having failed to appropriately constrain her planning by the subject B’s will – that it doesn’t 
count for the target as it should. It is fitting if this is indeed the case. Here the strictly 
descriptive content is that A’s planning isn’t constrained or shaped by B’s will in way w. The 
response-dependent normative content is that it is morally desirable that A’s planning is 
constrained or shaped in way w, and also that it is morally desirable to impose costs on A to 
ensure that it is (since resentment manifests itself in behavior that imposes some cost on its 
target to get her to take the subject’s will into account). The old-fashioned sentimentalist 
way of cashing this out is to say that any suitable impartial spectator would want, indeed 
insist, A to constrain or shape her planning in way w. Since I’ve briefly argued that the 
relevant kind of impartial spectator is a Nagelian Imp, my proposal is that blame is fitting if 
and only if and because the agent fails to constrain or shape her planning and intentions as a 
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well-informed Nagelian Imp would want her to do, so that any such spectator would endorse 
resentment and guilt on the part of the agent.  
What I’ve said above is formal and normatively neutral in the sense that it involves 
taking no stand on what particular things merit blame. Two people who accept the analysis 
could still disagree about when blame is fitting – indeed, on the kind of neo-sentimentalist 
account I’ve sketched, this kind of moral disagreement comes to disagreeing about how a 
Nagelian Imp would react. But as it turns out, accepting a characterization of a morally 
authoritative subject does have normative consequences, so that the scope for reasonable and 
informed disagreement is at least reduced. (This is where the metaphysical sentimentalist 
moves from the ‘is’ of a certain kind of subject’s reactions to the ‘ought’ of fittingness 
happens.) For given the concerns and capacities of the Nagelian Imp, it is not an open 
question how he would want people to constrain and shape their other-involving plans. 
The Imp, recall, is concerned, first of all, with his standing relative to others. So he 
wants people to rule out certain options with regard to him. Since he wants to make up his 
own mind, he wants others not to bypass his capacity to make choices, or manipulate it to 
someone else’s advantage, or to disable it by depriving him of basic necessities. When his 
plans rely on others doing their part, he wants those others to at least make an effort, or they 
will turn out to have acted in such a way that they might as well have manipulated him into 
doing his part. For brevity, let me adopt the popular, though potentially misleading phrase, 
and say that he wants others to rule out using him as mere means for their ends, and to make 
promoting his capacity to pursue form and pursue his ends as one of their own ends.5 As 
Adam Smith puts it,  
What chiefly enrages us against the man who injures or insults us, is the little account 
which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he gives to himself 
above us, and that absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other people 
                                                
5 The echoes of Kant’s Formula of Humanity are obviously not a coincidence. 
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may be sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency or his humour. (Smith 1759–
1790/2002, 112–113) 
 
What’s more, the Imp wants others not to be in a position to use him for their ends, which is 
to say he wants there to be costs for others if they fail to rule out using him. Since the Imp 
occupies everyone’s position serially and keeps track of the responses, adopting the strongest 
preference as his desire, he will be against anyone using another for her ends, and for 
protecting everyone from being used or neglected. By the standard proposed here, then, 
blame will be fitting response to anyone acting on a maxim of treating another as a mere 
means, or failing to treat them as ends. However, the Imp will not mind if an action benefits 
one person more than another, as long as this doesn’t affect people’s relative standing in this 
fundamental respect. Thus, if someone adopts a plan that aims exclusively at her own benefit 
or at the benefit of someone she cares about, the Imp does not necessarily desire that she 
change her plan even if she could do something else that would maximize benefit, 
considered impersonally. For the Imp is an impartial, not an impersonal spectator. And 
impartiality doesn’t mean wanting the best outcome, but giving equal weight to everyone’s 
grounds for resentment and other blaming attitudes. As Smith’s formulation hints, not every 
preference given to oneself (or someone else) is “unreasonable”, of the sort that would 
manifest a blameworthy quality of will. I’ll return below to what these facts about the Imp’s 
reactions means for the permissibility and impermissibility of actions. 
 
3. Why the Blame-Wrongness Link Doesn’t Hold 
We now have a sketch of when negative reactive attitudes are fitting on neosentimentalist 
grounds. If it is indeed the case that an act is wrong if and only if it is fitting to blame the 
agent, in the absence of an excusing condition, it seems that we have the analysis that 
sentimentalists need to connect deontic properties with our attitudes. While wrongdoing 
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doesn’t entail blameworthiness because of the possibility of excuses and exemptions, 
blameworthiness does entail wrongdoing, if the Blame-Wrongness link holds. This link is 
thus crucial to the Gibbardian strategy of moving from fitting attitudes towards agents to the 
moral status of actions. 
Alas, in recent years even nonconsequentialist ethicists have presented powerful 
arguments against the Blame-Wrongness Link, which consequentialists have always found 
problematic. Perhaps most notably, Thomas Scanlon (2008) argues that there is a 
fundamental difference between the two moral dimensions of permissibility and meaning of 
an action. On his view, blame and blameworthiness have to do with the meaning of an action, 
or what it says about a person’s relations to others: 
[T]o claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action 
shows something about the agent’s attitudes towards others that impairs the relations 
that others can have with him or her. (Scanlon 2008, 6) 
 
This is compatible with what I said above about blameworthiness. However, Scanlon goes 
on the argue that questions of permissibility are strictly distinct from questions of blame, 
since they concern actions themselves and not the process whereby the agent arrived at the 
action. Not only is it possible to perform impermissible actions without blame, but it is also 
possible to be blameworthy for performing permissible actions. For a simple example, 
consider one of Frances Kamm’s variants of the standard trolley case, in which it is possible 
to divert a trolley threatening to kill five people to a side track on which it will kill one 
person: 
Suppose that it is a bad person who sees the trolley headed toward the five. He has no 
interest in saving the five per se, but he knows that it is his enemy who will be the 
one person killed if he redirects the trolley. He does not want to be accused of acting 
impermissibly, however, and so while he redirects the trolley in order to kill the one, 
he does so only because he believes that (i.e., on condition that) a greater good will 
balance out the death. Hence, he would not turn the trolley unless he expected the 
five to be saved (Bad Man Case). His redirecting the trolley is still permissible, I 
believe, though he does it in order to kill his enemy. (2007, 132) 
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Here Bad Man is surely blameworthy, but his action is morally permissible (assuming it is 
such in the original trolley case). Nor does it seem necessary for permissibility that Bad Man 
expects the five to be saved – even if he didn’t care about the five at all, turning would still 
be permissible. Surely one can do the right thing for the wrong reasons, and so merit blame. 
(For reasons of space, I’ll leave aside here other kinds of purported counterexamples to the 
Blame-Wrongness Link, such as so-called suberogatory actions and doing the right thing 
accidentally or in the mistaken belief that it’s wrong.6) 
 Beyond intuitions about cases, critics of the Blame-Wrongness Link and mental state 
accounts of permissibility in general appeal to a difference between different contexts in 
which we can ask questions about the moral status of an action (Thomson 1999, Scanlon 
2008). One context is criticizing others, in which case the agent’s mental states such as 
intentions matter. But another is deliberation and advice. When deliberating, we ask whether 
an option is permissible or not. Here our own mental states don’t seem to matter. In the 
context of deliberation, we’re trying to decide what to do – intentions are the output of such 
deliberation, not inputs to it. So when we’re deliberating, we need criteria for permissibility 
that don’t depend on which intention we end up with afterwards. The same goes for advice 
to others – it’s no use to say that something is permissible if you do it with one intention and 
impermissible if you do it with another intention. So it seems that permissibility of an action 
can’t depend on intentions, or more broadly on the quality of will of the agent. 
Here, in brief, is the challenge these considerations pose for sentimentalism: 
1. Reactive attitudes are fitting on the basis of the agent’s quality of will. 
2. For sentimentalists, facts about moral permissibility and impermissibility are 
grounded in fitting reactive attitudes. 
                                                
6 For discussion of such cases, see Capes 2012. 
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3. If facts about moral permissibility and impermissibility are grounded in fitting 
reactive attitudes, they are determined by the quality of the will with which the agent 
acts. 
4. Facts about moral permissibility and impermissibility are independent of the quality 
of the will with which the agent acts. 
5. So, facts about moral permissibility and impermissibility are not grounded in fitting 
reactive attitudes. 
6. So, sentimentalists can’t account for moral permissibility and impermissibility of 
actions. 
 
There are several ways that a sentimentalist might try to avoid the conclusion. The first 
premise is unassailable and accepted on all sides, and the third seems to follow from the first 
two. So the first salient possibility is rejecting the second premise. After all, sentimentalists 
don’t think that all normative or evaluative facts are grounded in reactive attitudes in 
particular. Perhaps that is one way to understand what Hume is up to in his discussion of 
artificial virtues in Treatise 3.2 (Hume 1739–40/2006), when he switches focus from 
motives to consequences of rules for the general good. On this type of view, facts about 
permissibility are determined by rules it would be impersonally desirable for people to live 
by or internalize. Blame might then be fitting derivatively when one culpably violates such a 
rule. But it would be surprising and radically revisionary if the correctness of reactive 
attitudes depended on such impersonal quality of the will as following a useful rule. If you 
frivolously break a promise you’ve made to me, you’ve (pro tanto) wronged me. My 
response to you isn’t some sort of general disapproval because you’ve violated a socially 
desirable rule, but resentment for what you did to me. What it is fitting for other people to 
feel is different. Were my resentment fitting because of your attitude toward beneficial rules 
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and not because of your attitude towards me in particular, there would be no reason for any 
asymmetry between my attitudes and those of third parties. My resentment is a second-
personal response, in Stephan Darwall’s (2006) language. Indeed, reactive attitudes are 
arguably essentially second-personal, since they make no sense from the perspective of a 
detached observer who stands over and above human affairs. Rather, they are potentially 
fitting in the context of an interpersonal relationship, in which we make demands of each 
other and expect a response. This seems to rule out the alternative of the fittingness of blame 
depending on something other than the quality of the will the agent displays towards another 
person.7  
To be sure, someone rejecting the second premise might argue that this is just more 
evidence that blame and permissibility must be judged by different criteria. Perhaps what 
I’ve said above about fitting blame is right, but has nothing to do with right and wrong. But 
this, too, amounts to biting a bullet, since it means that the blameworthiness of someone who 
does something wrong and the wrongness of her action have nothing to do with each other. 
To borrow a point Paul Hurley (2006) has made in a slightly different context, morality is 
supposed to make demands of us, not just provide standards for our actions. If what we’re to 
blame for and what it’s wrong for us to do match only accidentally, it’s unclear in what 
sense morality demands us to avoid wrongdoing. Hurley puts the point in terms of our 
having reason to do the right thing, but on my view, this comes down to our being 
accountable for giving sufficient weight to doing the right thing in our practical thinking – in 
short, blameworthiness is conceptually prior to having reasons (see Kauppinen 2015). So 
                                                
7 As Remy Debes pointed out, sometimes following rules itself displays my attitudes towards other people. 
However, insofar as the rules in question are impersonally desirable ones, it is possible that there’s a 
divergence between the attitudes the agent manifests towards people in general and the second-personal 
attitudes they manifest towards the person they’re interacting with. The point I’m making is that it is the latter 
that makes reactive attitudes fitting. A sincere Stalinist who ruthlessly sacrifices a comrade in the name of 
progress, out of love for humanity, still does something the comrade may rightly resent. 
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other things being equal, I think it is better to pursue a different approach that doesn’t leave 
it to mere chance that we’re blameworthy for bad actions and praiseworthy for good actions. 
So instead of denying the second premise, sentimentalists might join those who have 
resisted separating impermissibility and the agent’s mental state, thus rejecting the fourth 
premise. To be sure, the case is far from closed, but I believe that the kind of considerations 
Scanlon, Thomson, Kamm, and others have put forward mean that defenders of mental state 
accounts of permissibility are on the back foot. I will therefore assume in the following that 
the fourth premise holds.  
What is there left for a sentimentalist to do? I believe the best strategy is to reject the 
third premise. It doesn't, after all, strictly follow from the first two. This is because although 
reactive attitudes are fitting on the basis of the agent’s quality of will, rightness and 
wrongness might be indirectly rather than directly grounded in them. That is, a sentimentalist 
need not appeal to a blameless quality of will in explaining the permissibility of an action. 
Instead, permissibility might be a matter of whether it is possible to perform the act in the 
circumstances without manifesting a blameworthy quality of the will. In such circumstances, 
even if one is to blame for one’s actual quality of the will, one could have performed the 
same act without meriting blame, so that blame isn’t externally supported, as I will put it in 
the next section. It is the external support for blame, or its absence, that will be crucial for 
explaining impermissibility and permissibility. 
 
4. External Support for Blame 
How could blame be somehow supported regardless of the agent’s actual state of mind? My 
proposal is simple: sometimes we find ourselves in circumstances in which it is not possible 
to achieve a certain end by certain means without meriting blame, assuming that we are 
rational, informed, and lack any other kind of excuse. (I will give concrete examples soon.) 
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If that is the case, taking the means is morally impermissible. There is external support for 
blame for A-ing in C, if it is not possible to A in C without being to blame while fulfilling 
the conditions for accountability. At other times, we find ourselves in circumstances in 
which it is possible for us to achieve a certain end by certain means without meriting blame, 
even if we are rational, informed, and lack any other kind of excuse. If that is the case, 
taking the means is morally permissible.8 There is no external support for blame for A-ing in 
C, if it is possible to A in C without being to blame, even if one fulfills the conditions of 
accountability. The key to the solution is that in the latter kind of scenario, even if we merit 
blame in virtue of our actual quality of the will, we could have performed the act we did 
blamelessly, without needing an excuse. Since external support is missing, the action is 
permissible, although the agent is blameworthy. Yet the permissibility or impermissibility of 
the action is still a function of fitness of being held accountable, albeit indirectly. What I call 
the Indirect Blame-Wrongness Link still holds. 
 This brief sketch raises various questions. Above all, what is it that determines 
whether it is possible (or not) to take some means to some end without meriting blame? 
Clearly, the answer to whether there is external support for blame must depend on what 
means to what ends are available in the agent’s circumstances. To put it in more objective 
terms, the question is what kind of causal chains the agent can initiate and how desirable the 
outcomes of these causal chains are. So, whether there is external support hangs on the 
causal-evaluative structure of the agent’s options, or what Frances Kamm, whose work I will 
draw on in what follows, calls the “objective correlative” of possible plans (Kamm 2007, 
136). 
 Probably the best way to put flesh on these bones is to look at concrete cases, laying 
out their causal-evaluative structure and examining how it relates to potential 
                                                
8 This principle is directly inspired by Frances Kamm’s (2007, ch. 5) non-state-of-mind theory of deontological 
constraints.  
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blameworthiness. I’m going to focus on the two most basic trolley cases, Switch and 
Footbridge. They are often criticized for being unrealistic, but they do have the virtue of 
throwing some morally relevant features of ordinary actions into sharp relief. Here is the first 
one, Switch: 
 
In Switch, a bystander has the choice of either hitting a switch to turn a runaway train to a 
side track or refraining from action. If the bystander refrains, the train will hit and kill five 
people, while one person on the side track will be unharmed. (Note that harmful events, or 
events that involve someone in non-consensual harm, are marked in red, and good 
consequences are marked in green.) If the bystander hits the switch, the train is diverted to 
the sidetrack, which amounts to saving the five. Unfortunately, the train then hits the one 
person, who will die. Note here that it is the greater good (saving the five) that causes the 
lesser evil (the harm to and death of the one). In analyzing the case in terms of its causal-
evaluative structure, Kamm maintains that what explains the permissibility of hitting the 
switch in this case that the harm being causally downstream from the benefit (Kamm 2007, 
138ff). (I will return below to why and how this matters to permissibility.) She offers many 
other variants to illustrate the same idea. For example, it is permissible to save five people 
from being killed by the trolley, even if the result is that they tumble down a cliff and their 
combined weight kills one person.  
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 Here is the causal-evaluative structure of the Footbridge case: 
 
In the Footbridge case, too, the agent faces the choice between letting five die or killing one. 
But here the causal structure is different. While refraining from action has the same 
consequences, the only alternative is pushing a heavy person off a footbridge to stop the 
train before it hits the five, thus killing the one person. Here the event that involves the one 
in harm, or lesser evil* in Kamm’s terms, is causally necessary to bring about the good event, 
stopping the train, which in context amounts to saving the five. Here doing bad things to one 
causes good things to others. Kamm maintains that this is what explains why pushing the 
heavy person is impermissible. She presents an impressive list of variants, such as Quinn’s 
(1989) case of driving over an innocent person in an ambulance to save the lives of five 
patients (which involves harm as a side effect rather than means in mental state terms). 
 It is an obvious question at this point just why causal structure should have such 
moral significance. Again, Kamm does provide a persuasive deeper rationale appealing to 
the relative status of the people who are involved in the causal relationships. What happens 
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in the Switch case, for example, the One person is substituted for the Five others as a victim 
when the bystander hits the switch. When harm to someone is causally downstream from the 
good to others, involving the person in harm doesn’t serve the interests of the others. The 
good thing for the Five has already happened when the trolley is turned, and before it hits the 
One. In this important respect, the One and the Five are in the same position vis-à-vis each 
other. By contrast, in Footbridge, if the One is pushed down, she is made to serve the others 
in an important sense. As Kamm puts it, one person is subordinated to another, when 
specifying her causal role in a scenario “makes essential reference to his usefulness to 
achieving a good for that other person” (Kamm 2007, 165). So causal structure matters 
morally, because subordination matters morally. 
 But why does subordination matter morally? Why should it matter what kind of 
causal role one plays in producing an outcome? Is it just a brute normative fact? Kamm and 
other pure externalists about permissibility are plagued by such questions. Alastair Norcross, 
for example, is puzzled by Kamm’s non-mental-state account: 
If the notions of respect or inviolability … really just amount to constraints on the 
permitted causal routes to and between harms and benefits, it is hard to see them as 
anything other than fetishizing certain causal processes. … How could this be 
relevant to justified moral concern for others? (Norcross 2008, 16) 
 
This is where sentimentalism promises a further explanation in terms of accountability. 
When the only causal chain available to bring about an end involves subordinating one 
person to another, there is no way to pursue the end without gaining the blame of an 
impartial spectator of the Nagelian Imp type (unless, perhaps, the stakes are high enough). 
This isn’t to say that a morally authoritative subject’s reactions are normatively fundamental. 
To that extent, I agree with Kamm’s claim that the “objective correlative” of plans (in other 
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words, what I’ve called the causal-evaluative structure of the possible act) is primary. But 
the sentimentalist claim is that the fact that initiating certain causal chains is impermissible is 
metaphysically grounded in subjective evaluative reactions. It is no fetishism to care about 
whether possible actions involve people in ways that any impartial spectator would object to 
(or that you would yourself object to in the victim’s shoes).  
Consider the causal-evaluative structure of the trolley cases from this perspective. In 
section 3, I quoted Kamm’s Bad Man case as a counterexample to the Blame-Wrongness 
Link. The Bad Man, recall, is in the Switch situation, but only turns the train in order to kill 
the One on the side track. Since we’re assuming she’s innocent, future life is good for her, 
and she hasn’t consented, Bad Man is surely blameworthy because of his plan. But it would 
have been possible for someone in the Bad Man’s place to act with the intention of saving 
the Five, and without wishing anything ill for the One or using the One as a means to save 
the Five.9 In other words, it would have been possible to perform the action without protest 
from the Nagelian Imp. 
In Footbridge, in contrast, it is not possible for the agent to involve the One in harm 
in a way that doesn’t merit blame. More precisely, it is not possible for the agent to do so, 
insofar as she is rational, knows the relevant facts, and meets the general conditions of 
responsibility. No doubt she’ll be more blameworthy if her end is to kill the One, and saving 
the Five is just a side effect. But even with the best of intentions, she’ll have to intend to 
make the One her instrument, insofar as she’s rational. She’ll have to act with a quality of 
will that the Nagelian Imp would want her not to have. To use Kamm’s (2007) terms, I think 
it’s a credible conjecture that, other things being equal, if A-ing necessarily involves 
nonconsensual harm that is not downstream(ish) from a comparable good to more people, 
any plan involving A-ing, even with the best of intentions, requires making a person serve 
                                                
9 I am here assuming that Thomson’s (2008) change of heart about the Switch case is a mistake, as FitzPatrick 
(2009) convincingly argues. 
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the good of others regardless of their will. Taking into account what I’ve said about the 
likely reactions of the Nagelian Imp, it seems that he would endorse blaming the agent for 
any such plan. Thus, it is very plausible that subordination (among other things), defined 
solely in terms of the causal structure involving harms and benefits to people, externally 
supports blame. 
 To sum up, I think these cases illustrate a two related general theses that we can 
formulate as follows: 
External Support for Blame 
Blame for A-ing in circumstances C is externally supported if adopting any plan 
involving A-ing in C would make blame fitting, assuming the agent is rational, 
informed, and meets the conditions of accountability. 
Indirect Blame-Wrongness Link 
A-ing in C is morally impermissible if and only if and because blame for A-ing in C 
is externally supported. 
 
In the interest of keeping the things simple, I won’t discuss other cases put forward as a 
challenge to the Blame-Wrongness link here. But what about the more principled objection 
that we should firmly distinguish between contexts of critical assessment of the agent, on the 
one hand, and advice and deliberation, on the other? A proponent of the Indirect Blame-
Wrongness Link agrees that we need a notion of permissibility that is distinct from 
blameworthiness, and that when we deliberate or give advice, we don’t consider what quality 
of the will we would be acting with. Rather, in deliberation and advice we consider the 
features that would or wouldn’t lend external support for blame, for example whether taking 
certain means to our end would involve subordinating the good of some to the good of others. 
To take a standard case, if an air force commander asks the Prime Minister whether he 
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should bomb a munitions factory to speed up the end of a just war, when the consequences 
include killing children in a nearby kindergarten, there’s no suggestion that she should reply 
“it depends on whether killing the children is part of your plan for killing the war or whether 
it is just a regrettable side effect”, although his blameworthiness does depend on his plans (cf. 
Thomson 1999). Instead, what is pertinent to moral advice and deliberation is whether the 
bombing is likely to achieve the goal of shortening the end of the war by way of killing the 
children (and the grief it causes) or by way of reducing available ammunition, and whether 
the alternative is that even more innocents die if the war is prolonged. So what the Prime 
Minister should say is that the air force may bomb only if doing so is necessary to avoid 
sufficiently awful consequences and destroying the factory is sufficient to promote this aim 
without involving innocents in harm (even if they will be harmed in actual fact). She might 
also say, truthfully but less informatively, that the air force may bomb only if it is possible to 
arrive at the decision by reasoning that doesn’t make a morally authoritative subject resent 
them. Thus, with the Indirect Blame-Wrongness Link, the crucial distinction between 
contexts of deliberation and assessment is preserved, even though ultimately the criteria of 
permissibility derive from fitting reactive attitudes. 
 
5. Conclusion: From Metaethics to Normative Ethics? 
In this paper, I’ve been exploring the possibility of ambitious neo-sentimentalism, a form of 
sentimentalism that proposes to ground not only evaluative properties like being funny or 
being shameful but also deontic properties like being right and being wrong in fitting 
sentimental responses. My sketch is obviously not intended to be the final word on the 
matter. For one thing, I’ve only focused on the sentimentalist analysis of permissibility and 
impermissibility, and haven’t said anything about how such fundamental notions as rights or 
reasons might be grounded in fitting attitudes (though for the latter, see Kauppinen 2015). 
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But even so, what I’ve said may seem overambitious to some eyes. I have, after all, breached 
one of the red lines of contemporary metaethics: I have argued that although we can defend a 
particular characterization of a morally authoritative subject in non-moral terms, a 
sentimentalist fitting attitudes analysis has substantive normative implications. This is to 
move from a metaethical ‘is’ to a normative ethical ‘ought’.10  
To be sure, there is precedent for such a move. I quoted earlier Hume’s summary of 
his version of sentimentalist metaethics. This is how the passage continues: 
We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this 
influence [of giving rise to approbation in a suitable spectator]: We consider all the 
circumstances, in which these actions agree: And thence endeavour to extract some 
general observations with regard to these sentiments. (Hume 1777/2006, 270) 
 
The “general observations” are the normative claims that Hume makes, such as the claim 
that character traits that are beneficial or immediately pleasing either to the agent herself or 
others are virtues. This methodological comment fits with Hume’s actual practice: he 
frequently makes observations about the “plain matter of fact” concerning people’s reactions 
in suitable circumstances, and draws conclusions about what is actually right or wrong. The 
benefit of proceeding in this fashion in doing normative ethics is that there is no appeal to 
controversial moral intuitions but only to what follows from the putatively neutral 
foundational facts about morality. In this move, Hume is not alone: on a plausible reading, 
Kant and modern-day Kantians do just the same, only with a rationalist conception of 
metaethical foundations. 
                                                
10 I have left aside expressivist variants of sentimentalism. However, it is worth mentioning at this point that for 
a hybrid expressivist like Michael Ridge (2006), the question of who is a morally authoritative subject (an ideal 
advisor) is already a first-order question – if we disagree morally while agreeing on non-moral facts, our 
disagreement consists in the fact that we regard different kinds of subject as authoritative. Thus, what my 
variant of ambitious neo-sentimentalism treats as a metaethical question is already a normative question for 
Ridge, and the debate about whether the Utility Hare or Nagelian Imp is a better specification of the impartial 
spectator is fought at least partially on normative ground. 
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 Although the view I have defended is not rationalist, there is a discernible Kantian 
flavor to the normative conclusions I claim will follow from the best kind of sentimentalist 
framework. That’s no accident, since both my variety of the impartial spectator view and 
Kantianism focus on the possible quality of the agent’s will, specifically the way in which 
the agent’s reasoning and plans take the will of others into account. The key difference is 
that a sentimentalist is skeptical of deriving the requirement to never treat others as mere 
means, for example, from the very nature of practical rationality. Instead, it is founded on 
our contingent (though deeply rooted) tendency to resent those who treat us as having lesser 
worth, suitably idealized to serve a practical function for social animals like us. 
 There is a somewhat more modest conclusion to draw here, however. Instead of 
saying that the best form of neo-sentimentalism supports nonconsequentialist moral theory, 
we might say that for neo-sentimentalists, the metaethical and normative inquiries must 
proceed hand in hand. In this framework, someone whose first-order intuitions are 
consequentialist must dispute the characterization of the morally authoritative subject whose 
reactions ground moral properties, or argue that it is something like an impartial spectator’s 
preferred rules rather than reactive attitudes that determine what is and isn’t permissible. 
Although I’ve given some reasons here to go one way rather than another, I can’t pretend 
that those considerations are in any way decisive. In any case, this kind of dispute is not just 
a matter of headbutting first-order intuitions or finding the best way to systematize them. It 
requires making the case that the Utility Hare, for example, is after all a more suitable model 
of a morally authoritative subject than the Nagelian Imp, and doing so requires reflection on 
such issues as human nature and the function of morality. I believe that shifting focus to such 
matters – pursuing a sentimentalist metaethics along with normative ethics – may offer a 
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